This paper documents the delayed adoption of a major technological innovation: the adoption of the diesel locomotive in the US railway industry. Contrary to other instances of major technological innovations, the delay in the adoption of the diesel locomotive was not associated with an initial slump in output. We provide a theoretical model which is consistent with both an increase and a decrease in output following the invention of a new technology. Within this model we identify the key factors that make a slump in output unlikely.
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1. Introduction 1.1. Overview New technologies are adopted on a large scale and have a sizable productivity e ect only after a prolonged period of time following their invention Mans eld 1968. A recent study by D a vid 1990 argues that this delayed adoption is associated with an initial slump in output, as observed in the case of the dynamo in the US. This paper documents an example of a major technological innovation: the adoption of the diesel locomotive in the US. In spite of an overall decrease in the numberof locomotives, the quantity of transportation services provided by the US railroad industry did not decrease.
The natural question to ask then, is why does the adoption of the dynamo generate an output decrease while the adoption of diesel locomotives generate an output increase? This paper proposes a theoretical model that is compatible with both of these outcomes and identi es the economic factors that may prevent an output slump following the invention.
A technological discovery may lead to an output slowdown because rms need to divert resources to develop the inputs needed by the new technology Helpman and Trajtenberg 1994 or to learn how to implement the new technology Aghion and Howitt 1996 . When a new technology is embedded in capital, however, as in the case of locomotives, a simpler model can explain a slowdown in investment and output.
Consider an industry whose production technology is embedded in machines which depreciate over time. Adopting a new technology therefore, means discarding current machines in favour of new ones. Suppose that at some date, machine manufacturers announce that a new and better type of machine will beavailable in the future and everyone knows that this new type of machine will eventually take over the whole industry. As a consequence, optimizing agents decrease their investments in current machines because they foresee their forthcoming obsolescence. The stock of machines therefore declines before the new machines are adopted. Although existing machines Technological Innovations: Slumps and Booms 2 may be used more intensively before being scrapped, their reduced number implies a decline in output before the adoption of their better successors generates a boom.
This provides an explanation for a slump in investment and in output following a technological discovery. It is not, however, compatible with stylised facts on technological innovation: investment tends to continue in the old technology during the early period of adoption of the new technology, and di usion curves in the new technology tend to beS-shaped Mans eld 1968, Chari and Hopenhayn 1991, Helpman and Trajtenberg 1996 . We therefore extend the simple model above in order to match these facts. This allows us to identify economic factors that make a slump in output unlikely, e v en if the innovation in not immediately widely adopted and the stock of capital decreases.
The key ingredients of the extended model are learning-by-doing in the machine producing sector and productivity heterogeneity in the sector which uses the machines as an input. When a new technology is invented, the rm for which the new machines yield the highest productivity gain adopts them rst. This adoption sparks the learning-by-doing process in machine production, making new machines progressively more competitive relative to the old machines. The other rms, foreseeing that new machines will eventually take over the industry, reduce their investment in old machines before selling them on the used market or scrapping them. In other words, each one of these rms behaves as the single rm of our initial model. Overall output is therefore subject to two countervailing e ects. On the one hand, the immediate adoption of the new technology by the relatively most e cient rm increases output. On the other hand, the reduction of investment in the old technology by the lagging rms reduces output. The resulting path of aggregate output depends on the relative size of these two e ects.
Two other factors counteract an initial output decline. First, rms using the old machines use them more intensively since they foresee their forthcoming obsolescence. This is compatible with the diesel locomotive evidence. Secondly, whenever a rm adopts the new technology, it sells the old machines on the used market where they are bought by the lagging rms who bene t from the implied price decrease. The 3 result is an increase in the production capacity of the lagging rms. This also explains why investment in both new and old machines can beobserved at the same time.
Learning-by-doing introduces an externality in the production of new machines. This externality induces lower than optimal investment in the new machinery. In addition, the sequence and timing of individual rms' switching decisions may be sub-optimal. A social planner would care not only about the relative productivity o f the two technologies within each rm, but also about the size of each rm, as this a ects the size of its investments and hence, the pace of the learning-by-doing in machine production.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the data concerning the adoption of the diesel locomotive in the US railroad industry. We then develop our basic model for the transmission of technological shocks in Section 3. Section 4 extends the basic model by i n troducing learning-by-doing and rms' heterogeneity i n the new technology. Section 5 concludes. In the remainder of this section, we provide a brief description of the related literature.
Related Literature
The papers most closely related to the present one are Helpman and Trajtenberg 1994 and 1996 and Aghion and Howitt 1996 They explain why the discovery of a general purpose technology may generate an initial slump in output before an eventual progressive increase as reported in David 1990 . Helpman and Trajtenberg 1994 and 1996 rely on a cost of adoption mechanism. In their economic environment, agents must develop a new range of intermediary inputs before adopting the new technology, represented by a new production function. This research and development activity diverts workers away from output production, 1 There is a wide body of literature concerned with technological innovation. See for example Chari and Hopenhayn 1991 , Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994 and Jovanovic and Nyarko 1997 among many others. However, except for the work of Helpman and Trajtenberg and that of Aghion and Howitt, this literature is not concerned with the potential negative e ect of innovations on output.
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Aghion and Howitt 1996 argue that uctuations in research and development and in employment of resources are not large and gradual enough to explain significant and progressive uctuations in output. Their model is build around a social learning assumption. Once the new technology is available, rms experiment with it. Only once a big enough mass of rms has experimented can the new technology be successfully adopted. The expenditure of resources incurred for the experimentation implies the slump in output and the delay before widespread adoption.
Our analysis di ers from both these papers in the mechanism that characterises the transition from the old technology to the new one, and in the implications of the model on aggregate output. As argued above, our mechanism does not rely on the complementarity of inputs or a learning externality in nal output production, but rather on the optimal investment policy of an agent. A key di erence in the empirical implications of our analysis is that the reduction in intermediate input may be associated with an increase, as well as a decrease, in output following the invention. Therefore, our model is compatible with both the observed slump which followed the invention of the dynamo as well as the steady increase of transportation services following the production of the rst diesel locomotive.
Empirical Evidence
Locomotives are an essential and costly input in the railroad transport industry. They depreciate over time. Adopting a new technology such as the diesel locomotive e n tails replacing the existing steam locomotives. In the early Twenties, a few countries had diesel locomotives where coal was lacking. In the U.S., the rst diesel locomotive was used for commercial demonstration in 1924 Mans eld 1968. Before that, most locomotives where built around steam engines. Figure 1 plots 
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Burlington railroads introduced the rst diesel powered train for main line service in 1934 Overton 1940 . Other companies followed, especially when the demand for transport services increased due to World War II.During the war, three quarters of new orders were for diesel locomotives.
By the mid to late Fifties, diesel locomotives had taken over the entire industry. The number of steam engines decreased sharply for several years before the numberof diesel locomotives started increasing, as is apparent from Figure 1 . Interestingly, the decrease in the number of steam locomotives starts the same year the diesel locomotive appears in demonstration in the U.S., 1924. One possibility for such a decrease could be a coincidental sharp improvement of the power of steam locomotives. Figure 2 addresses this concern by plotting the aggregate tractive p o w er of steam locomotives. It shows that the decrease in numberof locomotives was accompanied by a decrease in aggregate horse power with a marked change in its trend, again in 1924. One last possibility w e c heck is that the decrease in numberof steam locomotives is due to a decrease in demand for rail transport. Figure 3 shows this is not the case. This graph contests the argument that major technological changes generate slumps in output, unless one is prepared to argue that the switch from steam to diesel locomotives is the cause of the 1929 depression! Unfortunately, the U.S. recession of the Thirties does a ect our series, as well as the Second World War and later progress in road transport. The explanation seems to be that railroad companies started running larger trains on average. The number of car-miles per locomotive-mile indeed jumped above trend for the 1924-33 period as shown in Figure 4 . 2 The model we put forward in this paper does seem to t the introduction of the diesel locomotive. Of course, we are convinced that other mechanisms also played a role. For example, railroad rms waited to get more information about the performance and cost of running diesel locomotives before investing in them as in Aghion and Howitt 1996. Furthermore, they had to develop refuelling and maintenance 2 The data for Figures 1 through 4 are from the Bureau of Railway Economics which reports data for Class I railways. Around 1924, Class I railways were de ned as all the carriers with annual operating revenues above $ 1 ; 000; 000. They operated 90 per cent of the total railway mileage in the U.S., and earned about 96 per cent of the total revenues.
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The Basic Model
In this section, we present the basic model that a ords the key e ects described above. In particular, the discovery of a more productive technology is initially followed by a delayed output slump, and then by a progressive increase in output. Output does not rise until a few periods after the discovery, due to the delayed adoption of this new technology. Furthermore, even after the technology has been adopted, output continues to increase for a while before reaching the new steady state. As argued above, these e ects are the result of the interplay of the announcement of the new technology embedded in a new type of intermediate inputs machines, and the optimal investment policy of the representative agent. The downward pressure on output generated by the depreciation of old machines is partly compensated by a progressive increase in the intensity of use of these machines, followed by a progressive decrease in the intensity of use of new machines, until steady state is reached.
Economic Environment
Consider an open economy with a measure one of in nitely lived agents and three commodities: output y with xed price of 1, machines of type 1, k 1 , machines of type 2, k 2 , with prices q 1 and q 2 , respectively. Agents maximise the discounted sum of pro ts with discount factor = 1=1 + r, where r is the exogenous interest rate, r 0. Every period, agents use the technology y = i k i i to produce units of the consumption good. The inputs of this technology are the agent's indivisible endowment of management activity, normalised to 1, and an intermediate input:
7 a quantity k i of machines of two distinct types i 2 f1; 2g. The choice variable i denotes how intensively the machines of type i are used. Increasing the intensity of use of the machines increases output less than an increase in the amount o f m a c hines:
. Machines of type 2 are more productive than the machines of type 1: 2 1 0. An entrepreneur cannot use both types of machine at once. 4 Both types of machines require some maintenance. This cost is proportional to the number of machines an entrepreneur uses and the intensity with which she uses them: m k i;t i;t , where m is a positive parameter denoting the cost of maintenance. In addition, a proportion of machines breaks down every period. This last form of depreciation is independent of the use of the machines and corresponds to the usually assumed form of depreciation. In this context, we consider output to be nal goods production minus the maintenance expenditures.
Agents may freely borrow and lend at the interest rate r. The timing of the model is such that markets for machines open at the beginning of each period, then production takes place, and nally, the output market opens. We assume that the machines of type 1 are supplied according to an exogenous supply function 1 q 1 with 1 q = 0 , for allmin 1 , and 0 1 q 0 for any price q above q min 1 . 5 Furthermore, we assume that machines of type 1 have a scrap value q s 1 such that 0 q s 1 q min 1 . The positive scrap value corresponds to the market value of the raw material embedded in the machines.
Machines of type 2 are discovered and appear in the economy at some previously unknown time period t d . To simplify the analysis we take this discovery to be a complete surprise for the agents in the economy. When the discovery occurs, a sequence of prices for machines of type 2, fq 2;t g 1 t=t d is announced. This sequence is strictly decreasing until some later date t s t d : q 2;t q 2;t+1 , for every t t d , and 8 q 2;t = q 2;ts , for every t t s . 6 It is also such that the user cost of type 2 machines u 2;t = q 2;t , 1 , q 2;t+1 is decreasing between t d and t s .
Since this section focuses on the basic mechanism at play in our model, we treat the sequence of prices of type 2 machines as exogenous. The key purpose of the following section will be to identify the e ects at play here which carry through when production of type 2 machines is endogenized. Throughout, we assume an exogenously xed output price. Endogenizing it would only reinforce our results. From the rm's problem, we h a v e that the intensity of use of machines increases while their stock declines. This implies that output does not decline as fast as the stock of machines. It declines nonetheless, given that . By de nition, at time t all agents adopt the machines of type 2 which generates a sudden increase in the 12 level of output produced. This increase continues until date t s , while the user cost of the machines of type 2 continues to decrease as agents increase their stock. As the user cost decreases, the intensity of use also decreases until it reaches its steady state level.
The simulations reported on Figures 6 and 7 illustrate our argument. 7 Following the discovery of the better machines at t = 4, the representative rm cuts down on investment of machines of type 1. Its stock declines while the intensity with which i t uses this type of machines rises; output declines. At t = 9 , the rm scraps the type 1 machines and starts buying type 2 machines. As the rm's stock of new machines increases, output rises and the rm uses the machines less intensively.
We conclude this section with a comment on the e ciency of the dynamic equilibrium described above. The transition path we derive in this section is socially e cient. Indeed, the equilibrium path of the allocation of old machines and output coincides with the solution to the central planner's problem. Even if our model yields an initial decline in output, welfare cannot decrease because of the innovation, as there are no externalities and agents are free not to adopt the new technology. We obtain a decrease in output thanks to an intertemporal substitution mechanism as opposed to a labour reallocation mechanism, as in the literature cited earlier.
Endogenous Production of New Machines
In this section we specify the technology for the production of the type 2 machines. We assume that this technology bene ts from learning-by-doing. This extension of our basic model a ords three additional e ects with respect to the basic model described in Section 3 above. First, the decrease in the price of the type 2 machines is the result of learning-by-doing in the production of these machines and the endogenous decision 7 The parameters for this simulation are as follows: = :6, = :95, = :3, = :25, 1 = 1, 2 = 2, m = 1:25. In addition, the supply function for machines type 1 is such that their steady state price is 0.193 and no production of new machines takes place at or below the price 0.179. The announced sequence of type 2 machine prices is the one that will be generated in equilibrium in the simulations of the next section. It is approximately. f5:583; 4:482; 3:862; 3:422; 3:085; 2:828; 2:568; 2:299; 2:019; 1:730; 1:441; 1:181; 1:021; 1:000; 1:000; 1:000; g.
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of the heterogeneous rms to adopt the new machines. Second, rms heterogeneity allows for the possibility of continuing investment in the old technology while the new one starts being adopted. Third, the heterogeneity of the rms creates the potential for an externality exerted by the rms that adopt the new technology on the remaining rms that have not yet adopted it. The result of these e ects is an economy in which, following the introduction of the new technology, the stock of capital initially decreases and only later progressively increases. At the same time, aggregate output may immediately increase as in the adoption of the diesel locomotive documented in Section 2 or may initially decrease and only later increase, following the adoption of the new technology as in David 1990 , Helpman and Trajtenberg 1994 and Aghion and Howitt 1996 . Finally, a s highlighted in Chari and Hopenhayn 1991 and Helpman and Trajtenberg 1996, we observe continuing investment in the old technology while the new technology is available and adopted by some rms in the industry.
To keep the treatment as simple as possible, we assume that the technology that produces machines of type 2, after the innovation occurs, takes the following form: 14 constant cost of labour, w, the equilibrium price of machines of type 2 is: q 2;t = w + e ,K 2;t,1 13
We do not want labour reallocation between production of output and machines to a ect our model. Obviously, we know from Helpman and Trajtenberg 1994 that it could only reinforce our mechanism. This is why w e assume a perfectly elastic supply of labour. For learning-by-doing to generate a decreasing sequence of prices for type 2 machines, at least one rm must adopt them on the date of discovery. This instantaneous adoption is required in order to spark the learning-by-doing process. If all rms adopt at once, the mechanism of the previous section does not apply. Therefore, we introduce a form of heterogeneity in the productivity o f t ype 2 machines in the nal good technology. In particular, we assume J rms can produce the consumption good using the same intermediate input k 2;t . We take the type 2 machines to have di erent productivities across rms, The de nition of equilibrium here is similar to that of the previous section except that we account for the heterogeneity of the rms, keeping track of J t , and that we have an extra market and price for the type 2 machines. The equilibrium transition from one steady state to the other | following the technological innovation | can bedescribed as follows. At the announcement date, the price of the new machines is q 2;t d = w=. Assume . The result will be an even further decrease of the equilibrium price for type 2 machines.
Consider now rms j 1. These rm are facing a declining user cost and price of new machines. Therefore, the analysis presented in Section 3 above applies: the user cost of the type 1 machines u 1;t and the intensity of use of these machines 1;t increase. This increase together with the decrease in the price of type 2 machines u 2;t implies that at some future datet t d at least rm two the second relatively most 10 Notice that these conditions are more complex that it might seem at rst sight. In particular, in this new model, the user cost u 2;t d is only implicitly de ned by 3. Indeed, u 2;t d is a function of the price q 2;t d +1 . Learning-by-doing renders this price a function of the stock o f t ype 2 machines rm one has adopted at t d , k 1 2;t d , as in 13. In equilibrium, the stock k 1 The situation evolves in a similar fashion until all the rms that use type 2 machines in the new steady state have adopted the new technology.
Notice that in this equilibrium we observe a sequential pattern of adoption of the new technology. This implies that the output produced by each rm decreases following the innovation and then eventually increase when adoption occurs, with the exception of the most e cient rm which adopts at the announcement date and hence faces no slump in output. In addition, when a rm adopts the new technology, it releases old machines on the used market. If the amount the rm sells is larger than the aggregate quantity of machines lost by depreciation, then the output of the rms still using the old machines rises in the period of the adoption. In the aggregate, two distinct scenarios are possible. The rst scenario is characterized by a situation in which the increase in output generated by rm one's immediate adoption is more than compensated by the decrease in output of all the other rms. This is most likely if the rst rm to adopt is relatively small and it takes several periods before any other rm adopts the new technology. The result is an aggregate output which rst decreases and then increases as a result of enough rms switching to type 2 machines. The behaviour of aggregate output then replicates the type of ndings of Helpman and Trajtenberg 1994 and 1996 and Aghion and Howitt 1996 without relying on a labour reallocation mechanism. The second scenario, instead, is characterized by a situation in which the decline in aggregate investment in old machines is fully compensated by the increase in productivity of the rm that adopted the new technology, the increase in intensity of use of the old machines, and the increase in the investment in old machines by the rms that still use them.
This alternative behaviour is compatible with the empirical evidence on the adoption of the diesel locomotive as described in Section 2 above. In particular, it is possible to envisage parameter values of the model such that the overall numberof locomotives decreases before increasing, while the transportation services output do not decrease. Figure 8 provides an example by illustrating the result of a simulation of our model in the case of two rms. 11 Firm one immediately adopts the new technology at the period of discovery t = 4; rm two keeps the old technology. Although the production of type 1 machines stops at the date of discovery, the output of rm two increases at this date because rm two i n v ests in the old machines of rm one. Hence, rm two's output rises slightly. From then on, rm two is subject to the mechanism described in the previous section by which its stock of capital and output declines until it eventually joins rm one in the use of the new technology at t = 9 . Despite the increase in investment in the new technology, the aggregate output growth is slowed down during the initial part of the transition by the declining output of rm two. As rm two adopts the new technology, output is boosted by the increased e ciency of this rm. Furthermore, the adoption by rm two implies an increased demand of type two machines which accelerates the learning-by-doing process in their production. Notice that in Figure 9 , the investment in new machines is progressive. It actually displays the S-shaped pattern often noted in the empirical literature Mans eld 1968. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 10 , the model predicts investment in old machines at the individual rm level while the new machine is already being adopted. This matches the other stylised fact concerning the adoption of new technologies mentioned in the introduction Chari and Hopenhayn 1991, Helpman and Trajtenberg 1996. 12 Conditions 15, 16 and 17 do not include any measure of the bene t to other rms of the reduction in the price of type 2 machines generated by their adoption. The competitive equilibrium is therefore characterised by a slower adoption path with respect to the socially e cient one. This occurs for three reasons. First, the central planner would require each rm to invest more in type 2 machines for the 11 This simulation uses the parameters of the previous one with, in addition, = 4 : 5 ; = 1 ; w = 1 . The rm of the previous simulation is now rm two. Firm one has the productivity coe cients 1 1 = 1 , 1 2 = 4 .
12 In our simulation, this only happens for one period because we only have t w o rms.
purpose of better exploiting the learning-by-doing externality the usual" learningby-doing externality e ect. Secondly, the central planner would require rms j 1 to adopt the new technology earlier than in a competitive equilibrium. Thirdly, the central planner might not necessarily require rms to switch only according to their relative e ciency parameter
which is what matters in equilibrium. Instead, the central planner would also take i n to account the amount o f t ype 2 machines which each rm will use when switching. Hence, the rm size, determined by the absolute productivity of the rm with type 2 machines, j 2 , matters for e ciency whereas it is irrelevant in equilibrium. The result is that not only the levels of investment of each rm are socially suboptimal, but also the pattern of adoption may be. This implies that output growth possibly observed in the transition from one steady state to the other is socially ine cient, in the sense that a central planner would generate a higher increase in output, and hence, a higher growth with respect to the perfectly competitive equilibrium.
Concluding Comments
In this paper we document the adoption of the diesel locomotive in the US railway industry in the rst half of the century. We highlight a potential puzzle. Indeed, while the invention of the dynamo, as documented by David 1990 , leads to an initial decrease in output, the invention of the diesel locomotive d o e s not reduce the supply of transportation services. We provide a model which is compatible with both situations.
In particular, the paper identi es two k ey factors that may prevent a technological innovation from generating an initial slump in output. First, whenever a rm adopts a new technology, the extent to which its discarded factors of production are available on the used market is critical. If they are available for other rms to use, then only when the productivity of these factors is very heterogeneous across rms will the model generate a slump in output. Second, in many lot of industries, the intensity o f capital use is a choice variable. When the discovery of a new technology announces an obsolescence of existing capital faster than expected, it provides incentives for a more intensive use of this capital, hence, generating a decline in output less than proportional to the decline in the capital stock.
Finally, the paper highlights a learning-by-doing externality which yields inefciently slow di usion of new technologies, independent of whether the e ect on aggregate output is positive or negative. 
